In Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U. S. 349 (1993), we considered a provision in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 providing an exception to a foreign state’s immunity when “the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state.” 28 U. S. C. §1605(a)(2). The first two questions, relating to Marks, are as follows: (1) “Whether this Court’s decision in Marks means that the concurring opinion in a 4–1–4 decision represents the holding of the Court where neither the plurality’s reasoning nor the concurrence’s reasoning is a logical subset of the other”; and (2) “Whether, under Marks, the  lower courts are bound by the four-Justice plurality opinion in Freeman, or, instead, by Justice Sotomayor’s separate concurring opinion with which all eight other Justices disagreed.” Pet. We said that the phrase did not encompass a foreign state’s activity that “led to” the tortious conduct. The court stated that it had “considered the plea agreement [and] the sentencing guidelines, particularly the provisions of [§3553(a)],” and that it would “accept and approve the binding plea agreement.” App. R. Crim. 18-1 Remedies 68 2. But there are circumstances where the district court’s discretion is confined such that the Guidelines range does not play a meaningful part in the ultimate determination of the defendant’s sentence. Hughes asserts that the government suffers no meaningful loss of bargaining power because Congress, by amending the Sentencing Guidelines, determined that the higher sentencing range provided the government with an impermissible advantage over defendants.  This interpretation furthers §3582(c)(2)’s purpose, as well as the broader purposes of the Sentencing Reform Act. 564 U. S., at 527–528 (plurality opinion). To secure the sentence to which the parties already agreed, the Government likely will have to recreate the state of play from the original plea negotiations and sentencing to make counterfactual “what if” arguments—which, naturally, the defendant will then try to rebut. Id., at 36a, 47a. The law is explained with clear writing and an accessible approach, relating the subject to everyday examples. Offense levels are a factor in the sentencing range calculation; a reduction in offense level decreases the sentencing range produced by the Sentencing Guidelines. So in the usual case the court’s acceptance of a Type-C agreement and the sentence to be imposed pursuant to that agreement are “based on” the defendant’s Guidelines range. Explore the site for more case notes, law lectures and quizzes. But that ignores the crucial way in which Type-C defendants are not similarly situated to other defendants. Thus, Hughes maintains, the Guidelines are a proximate cause of the plea agreement, which is in turn a proximate cause of the judge’s sentence. § 3582(c)(2), which provides that a court may modify a prison sentence if the defendant was “sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered.” Hughes claims that his sentence was “based on” the Sentencing Guidelines because the Guidelines informed the negotiation of his plea agreement as well as the sentencing decision of the judge. In short, experience has shown that, although the interpretation proffered by Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Freeman could be one permissible reading of §3582(c)(2), the system Congress put in place is best implemented, as a systemic, structural matter, by the interpretation confirmed in the instant case. The United States also disagrees that the outcome-based approach would improperly give the opinion of a single Justice binding authority, even though eight other Justices disagree, because a majority of Justices would necessarily agree with the outcome of the case.  If the Guidelines range was not “a relevant part of the analytic framework the judge used to determine the sentence or to approve the agreement,” Freeman, supra, at 530, then the defendant’s sentence was not based on that sentencing range, and relief under §3582(c)(2) is unavail- able. §3553(a). for Cert. And in Molina-Martinez, the Court held that in the ordinary case a defendant suffers prejudice from a Guidelines error because of “the systemic function of the selected Guidelines range.” 578 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 10). But “when determining the sentence to impose,” the district court may base its decision on “one thing and one thing only—the plea agreement.” Freeman, 564 U. S., at 545 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). The Court dismisses this point as having “nothing to do with whether a defendant’s sentence was based on the Sentencing Guidelines.” Ante, at 12. And there is no reason a defendant’s eligibility for relief should turn on the form of his plea agreement. The district court then conducted a sentencing hearing to evaluate the plea agreement and determine whether Hughes’s plea conformed with the United States Sentencing Guidelines. P. 14.  Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Gorsuch, JJ., joined. Finally, the United States maintains that it is unfair to allow modifications to sentences based on plea agreements because plea agreements are like a contract between prosecutor and defendant, and sentence modifications would be like the defendant breaching a term of the contract. Tort law; Sources of law; Land law; Case summaries; Revision; Custom Search Home : Hughes v Lord Advocate . In Freeman v. United States, 564 U. S. 522, this Court considered whether a prisoner who had been sentenced under a plea agreement authorized by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure could have his sentence reduced under 18 U. S. C. §3582(c)(2) when his Federal Guidelines sentencing range was lowered retroactively. According to Hughes, the Eleventh Circuit should not have found a constructive majority under Marks because there are situations in which the concurrence would allow a sentence modification, reaching a different outcome from the plurality. Decatur, Georgia Firm Representing Clients Throughout Greater Metropolitan Atlanta and Throughout Georgia  More recently, in OBB Personenverkehr AG v. Sachs, 577 U. S. ___ (2015), we found that a cause of action was not “based upon” commercial activity when the activity established just one element of the action. He has litigated and tried cases against the Midwest’s top toxic tort and transportation attorneys. Plaintiff alleges multiple tort claims governed by California law. About four months later, the Government and Hughes negotiated a Type-C plea agreement. The sentencing range was thus a basis for the sentence imposed. The court calcu-  lated Hughes’ Guidelines range as 188 to 235 months in prison and heard statements from Hughes’ daughter, mother, and Hughes himself. Courts must also consider various other sentencing factors listed in §3553(a), including “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” §3553(a)(6).  A sentence imposed pursuant to a Type-C agreement is no exception to the general rule that a defendant’s Guidelines range is the starting point and a basis for his ultimate sentence. Hughes then contends that, even under the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, the Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Freeman is not binding law. They had marked it clearly as dangerous. C, Amdt. Both the text of the plea agreement and the judge’s statements in court indicate consideration of the Guidelines, according to Hughes. Tort law is a collection of such misbehaviours or misadventures where the law deems it appropriate to intervene with civil remedies. Id., at 544–548. The courts of appeals then confronted the question of what principle or principles considered in Freeman controlled when an opinion by four Justices and a concurring opinion by a single Justice had allowed a majority of this Court to agree on the judgment in Freeman but not on one interpretation or rule  that courts could follow in later cases when similar questions arose under the same statute and Rule. 53 terms. 28a.  For guidance courts turned to this Court’s opinion in Marks v. United States, 430 U. S. 188 (1977).  1. A sentence imposed pursuant to a Type-C agreement is “based on” the defendant’s Guidelines range so long as that range was part of the framework the district court relied on in imposing the sentence or accepting the agreement. In Peugh v. United States, 569 U. S. 530 (2013), for example, the Court held that the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits retroactive application of amended Guidelines that increase a defendant’s sentencing range. NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. Furthermore, the NACDL posits that prosecutors can pressure defendants into taking pleas by threatening to significantly increase sentencing recommendations if the case goes to trial. 10 - Inventory Control & Distribution. The case is also influential in negligence in the English law of tort (even though English law does not recognise "allurement" per se). The Eleventh Circuit’s approach to Marks, Hughes claims, creates indeterminacy because it is more difficult to predict the outcome that each opinion would yield. And in any event, “[w]hat is at stake in this case is a defendant’s eligibility for relief, not the extent of that relief.” Id., at 532 (plurality opinion).   (b) A district court imposes a sentence that is “based on” a Guidelines range for purposes of §3582(c)(2) if the range was a basis for the court’s exercise of discretion in imposing a sentence. For example, in Koons the Court today holds that five defendants’ sentences were not “based on” subsequently lowered Guidelines ranges because in that case the Guidelines and the record make clear that the sentencing judge “discarded” their sen- tencing ranges “in favor of mandatory minimums and substantial-assistance factors.” Post, at 5–6; see also Molina-Martinez, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 11) (“The record in a case may show, for example, that the district court  thought the sentence it chose was appropriate irrespective of the Guidelines range”). Thus, the sentencing range was a basis for the sentence that the District Court imposed. Hughes sought to modify his sentence under 15 U.S.C. Here the sentence that petitioner Hughes received “turned on” the agreement, not the Guidelines or anything else. DanielLegat PLUS.  In contrast, the Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and Ninth Circuits held that no opinion in Freeman provided a controlling rule because the reasoning in the concurrence was not a “logical subset” of the reasoning in the plurality. The Court characterizes this distinction as “artificial,” arguing that the district court’s ultimate imposition of a sentence often has as much to do with its Guidelines calculation as anything else. Id., at 535–536. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 3582(c)(2), which requires a sentence to be based on the Guidelines. Some courts interpreted Marks as directing them to follow the “narrowest” opinion in Freeman that was necessary for the judgment in that case; and, accordingly, they adopted the reasoning of the opinion concurring in the judgment by Justice Sotomayor. This Court’s precedents since Freeman have confirmed that the Guidelines remain the foundation of federal sentencing decisions. Essentials of Business Law, 11th Edition by Anthony Liuzzo and Ruth Calhoun Hughes (9781260734546) Preview the textbook, purchase or get a FREE instructor-only desk copy. In some cases defendants have been held ineligible for relief even where the sentencing hearing makes it crystal clear that the Government and the defendant agreed to a Guidelines sentence and the district court imposed one. 2016). Since his sentencing, the Sentencing Commission amended the Guidelines, reducing the sentencing range for Hughes’s crime to between 151 and 188 months. “In the (C) agreement context” it is “the binding plea agreement that is the foundation for the term of imprisonment.” Freeman, 564 U. S., at 535 (opinion of Sotomayor, J.).   Two cases decided after Freeman now reinforce this proposition. The Government and the defendant may agree to a specific sentence, but the Sentencing Guidelines prohibit district courts from accepting Type-C agreements without first evaluating the recommended sentence in light of the defendant’s Guidelines range. In so doing, it calculated Hughes’ Guidelines range as 188 to 235 months and determined that the sentence was in accordance with the Guidelines and other factors the court was required to consider. Hughes claims that this chain of proximate causation explains that the sentence resulting from a C-type plea agreement often resembles the sentence under the Guidelines, whether the sentence follows or deviates from the Guidelines range. The law is explained with clear writing and an accessible approach, relating the subject to …  In a Type-C agreement the Government and a defendant “agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is the appropriate disposition of the case, or that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines, or policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply,” and “such a recommendation or request binds the court once the court accepts the plea agreement.” Rule 11(c)(1)(C). Thus, in general, §3582(c)(2) allows district courts to reconsider a prisoner’s sentence based on a new starting point—that is, a lower Guidelines range—and determine whether a reduction is appropriate. 849 F. 3d 1008, 1016 (2017); App. But, in my view, that general rule was not absolute. “Even if the sentencing judge sees a reason to vary from the Guidelines, if the judge uses the sentencing range as  the beginning point to explain the decision to deviate from it, then the Guidelines are in a real sense the basis for the sentence.” Ibid. provide[s] for a specific term of imprisonment . . . Although in a Type-C agreement the Government and the defendant may agree to a specific sentence, that bargain is contingent on the district court accepting the agreement and its stipulated sentence. Less than two months after Hughes’s sentencing, the Sentencing Commission modified the Sentencing Guidelines via Amendment 782. Because Freeman’s fractured disposition provided insufficient guidance, courts of appeals have struggled over whether they should follow the Freeman plurality or my separate concurrence.  In the typical sentencing case there will be no question that the defendant’s Guidelines range was a basis for his sentence. Even within Circuits that follow the Freeman concurrence, unwarranted disparities have resulted depending on whether a defendant’s Type-C agreement has a specific-enough reference to a Guidelines range. It is also reinforced by Molina-Martinez and Peugh, which both confirm that the Guidelines remain a basis for almost all federal sentences. but also make[s] clear that the basis for the specified term is a Guidelines sentencing range.” Id., at 538–539. Tort law is a collection of such misbehaviours or misadventures where the law deems it appropriate to intervene with civil remedies.  The integrity and legitimacy of our criminal justice system depends upon consistency, predictability, and evenhandedness. Even if a sentence is based on multiple causes, Hughes argues that, applying tort law, multiple causes may be equally and completely charged with a single result as long as each is a proximate cause. §§ 29–20–101 to –408 (2000 & Supp.2010), against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee (“Metro”) and Frank Archey (the “Defendant”), an employee of the Metro Public Works Department, for … P. 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is generally eligible for a sentence reduction if there is a later, retroactive amendment to the relevant Sentencing Guidelines range.” Pet. As explained above, a district court must consider the defendant’s “applicable Guidelines range” when it decides whether to accept or reject the agreement, USSG §6B1.2(c)—often, as here, at the sentencing hearing, after the court has reviewed the presentence report. Hughes argues that a majority of the Court must agree upon the principle of law, not the outcome, or else the reasoning of a single Justice could have controlling effect even though eight Justices disagreed. They would have held that a defendant who pleads guilty pursuant to a Type-C agreement is categorically ineligible for a sentence reduction under §3582(c)(2) because such a sentence is always “based on” the plea agreement, and not on the Guidelines.   In response, the Government largely recycles arguments that a majority of this Court rejected in Freeman. ERIK LINDSEY HUGHES, PETITIONER v.UNITED STATES. According to the United States, when the Marks rule is correctly applied to Freeman, the one-Justice concurrence agrees with the four-Justice plurality to the extent that some cases cannot be given reduced sentences under § 3582(c)(2). Pp. 7–14. Tort Law Vocabulary. Hughes asserts that the Eleventh Circuit’s denial of his sentence modification incorrectly applied the Supreme Court’s decision in Marks v. United States when it held that the single-justice concurrence in Freeman v. United States was binding precedent even though no single rationale achieves a majority.  The Court stresses that the question presented concerns only a Type-C defendant’s eligibility under §3582(c)(2), and that the district court might exercise its discretion to deny a reduction if it “concludes that it would have imposed the same sentence even if the defendant had been subject to the lower range.” Ante, at 14; see ante, at 13 (suggesting that the district court “can consider the benefits the defendant gained by entering a Type-C agreement” in deciding “whether a reduction is appropriate”). Sackett asks that the Supreme Court hold that lower courts may only treat one opinion as binding and caution lower courts against interpreting single-Justice opinions as the holdings of fractured decisions. USSG App. Hughes should not receive a windfall benefit because that range has been changed. Settling this debate is unlikely to be as straightforward as the Court anticipates. The court then calculated Hughes’ sentencing range and imposed a sentence that the court deemed “compatible” with the Guidelines. Even if a defendant is eligible for relief, before a district court grants a reduction it must consider “the factors set forth in  section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable” and the Commission’s “applicable policy statements.” §3582(c)(2). A minority of courts apply a “logical subset” rule, requiring the holding to be the rule which fits into the broader opinion. Hughes Law Offices is NOT a general practice law firm. Rule 11(c)(5)(B). The district court can consider the benefits the defendant gained by entering a Type-C agreement when it decides whether a reduction is appropriate (or when it determines the extent of any reduction), “for the statute permits but does not require the court to reduce a sentence.” Freeman, supra, at 532.  The Government also contends that allowing courts to reduce the sentences of defendants like Hughes would be inconsistent with the Commission’s policy statement in USSG §1B1.10, which provides that when a district court modifies a sentence under §3582(c)(2) it “shall substitute only the [retroactive] amendments listed in subsection (d) for the corresponding guidelines provisions that were applied when the defendant was sentenced and shall leave all other guideline application decisions unaffected.” USSG §1B1.10(b)(1). msrlawbooks Law of Torts P T O Page 3 Ch. Instead, we interpreted the phrase to refer only to the conduct that forms “the ‘basis,’ ” or “foundation,” of the cause of action—that is, “the ‘gravamen of the complaint.’ ” Id., at 357. See Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. The claimant was offering oats for sale, and exhibited a sample of those oats. (similarly defining “basis”).  In this case the District Court accepted Hughes’ Type-C agreement after concluding that a 180-month sentence was consistent with the Sentencing Guidelines. Sotomayor, J., filed a concurring opinion. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on December 8, 2017. Brief for United States 52.  I continue to believe that my Freeman concurrence sets forth the most convincing interpretation of §3582(c)(2)’s statutory text. Why Hughes v Lord Advocate is important. 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